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This Article addresses the recent pretrial diversion scheme undertaken by the
Department of Justice in conjunction with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Pilot
Program—specifically, “declinations with disgorgement.” Pursuant to the Pilot
Program, the Department of Justice declined to prosecute or even continue an inves-
tigation, provided the company disgorge its alleged ill-suprgotten gains. This
Article dissects both the purpose of, and terminology used in, declinations with
disgorgement and argues that this novel and creative pretrial diversion is a danger-
ous conflation of legal remedial theories and terms. A criminal disposition cannot
be a declination with attendant penalties because either illegal activity occurred or
it did not; prosecutorial discretion does not allow an “in-between” option of decli-
nation while simultaneously requiring disgorgement. Calling these dispositions
“declinations” and the penalties associated therewith “disgorgement” is a wild mis-
use of the terms, which creates a crisis in the expressive function of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and in the legal lexicon itself.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2016, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Criminal Divi-
sion announced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) Pilot
Program, a program aimed at incentivizing voluntary disclosure
and compliance.1 At base, the Pilot Program requires voluntary self-
1. ANDREW WEISSMANN, DOJ, CRIMINAL. DIV., THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 2 (2016) [hereinafter PILOT PROGRAM
MEMO], https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/838386/download. The initial one-year Pilot Pro-
gram ended on April 5, 2017, but the Justice Department has stated that it will be keeping
the Pilot Program in place. See Kenneth A. Blanco, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ, Remarks
Before the American Bar Association National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 10,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-kenneth-
blanco-speaks-american-bar-association-national. On November 29, 2017, the Department of
Justice indicated the the Pilot Program was going to be inserted into the U.S. Attorney’s
Manual as definitive policy for sentencing in corporate criminal matters. See Department of
WINTER 2018] Declinations with Disgorgement 271
disclosure and cooperation with the government in order to be eli-
gible for a declination from the DOJ.2 Since its inception, three
public companies have disgorged profits to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) in return for a declination from the
DOJ.3 On September 29, 2016, the DOJ announced that it was pro-
viding two different private companies with declinations regarding
potential FCPA liability but required that these two companies dis-
gorge their profits to the Department of Treasury.4 These two cases
represented the first “declinations with disgorgement” granted by
the DOJ in FCPA enforcement. Since that date, the DOJ has
awarded two more companies “declinations with disgorgement.”5
What makes these dispositions so novel? After all, disgorgement ex-
tracted by the SEC is par for the course in FCPA enforcement.
Disgorgement demanded by the DOJ, however, is not. The implica-
tions of issuing “declinations” with the requirement of
“disgorgement” are alarmingly far-reaching.
The Pilot Program’s stated goal is to promote greater accounta-
bility for individuals and companies involved in FCPA-related
misconduct. Although intending to incentivize other companies to
self-disclose in order to get a coveted declination from the govern-
ment, these “declination with disgorgement” cases instead distort
the traditional understandings of critical legal terms. Specifically,
these dispositions bastardize the term “declination,” as well as the
term “disgorgement.” As such, a “declination with disgorgement” is
Justice Corporate Enforcement Policy, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/
download.
2. PILOT PROGRAM MEMO, supra note 1, at 9.
3. These companies are Nortek Inc., Akamai Technologies, and Johnson Controls. See
Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., DOJ, to Luke Cardigan, K&L Gates
LLP, Counsel for Nortek, Inc. (June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/
865406/download; Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, Criminal Div., DOJ, to Josh Levy,
Ropes & Gray LLP, Counsel for Akamai Technologies, Inc. (June 6, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865411/download; Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy
Chief, Criminal Div., DOJ, to Jay Holtmeier & Erin G.H. Sloane, WilmerHale LLP, Counsel
for Johnson Controls, Inc. (June 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/
874566/download.
4. Letter from Lorinda Laryea, Trial Att’y, Criminal Div., DOJ, to Steven A. Tyrell,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Counsel for HMT, LLC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899116/download [hereinafter Letter to HMT, LLC];
Letter from Lauren N. Perkins, Assistant Chief, Criminal Div., DOJ, to Paul E. Coggins &
Kiprian Mendrygal, Locke Lord LLP, Counsel for NCH, Corp. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899121/download [hereinafter Letter to NCH, Corp.].
5. Letter from Nicola J. Mrazek, Senior Litig. Counsel, Criminal Div., DOJ, to Nathan-
iel B. Edmonds, Paul Hastings LLP, Counsel for CDM Smith Inc. (June 29, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/976976/download; Letter from Lauren N. Per-
kins, Assistant Chief, Criminal Div., DOJ, to Lucina Low & Thomas Best, Steptoe & Johnson
LLP, Counsel for Linde Gas America, Inc. (June 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/974516/download.
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an inherently oxymoronic statement. What occurs in these disposi-
tions involves neither a declination nor disgorgement. Yet the
inappropriate use of these terms is not without significant repercus-
sions. Misusing the legal lexicon creates a crisis surrounding the
expressive function of law and legal language6 and constructs a met-
aphorical Tower of Babel for lawmakers, regulators, companies,
and stakeholders.7
This Article contributes to the literature by analyzing the very
recent and novel creation of a new type of DOJ disposition: “decli-
nation with disgorgement.” In this Article, I will analyze the terms at
issue, “declination” and “disgorgement,” and discuss why and how
they are being misused in the Pilot Program’s dispositions de-
scribed above. In Part I, this Article sets the backdrop of the Pilot
Program by describing the statutory contours of the FCPA. In doing
so, this Article will analyze the recent trends in FCPA enforcement
and the uptick in pretrial settlement agreements. This Article will
take a historical look at the remedy of disgorgement and its rise to
omnipresence in FCPA enforcement, particularly when the true
value of ill-gotten gains may be hard to define or calculate.
Part II addresses the creation of “declinations with disgorge-
ment” under the Pilot Program and dissects the phrase into its
critical terms, “declination” and “disgorgement.” This Part analyzes
the dangerous misuse of the terms. Put simply, a “declination” is a
one-sided decision made by the government to not pursue charges
against a defendant. It is not a contract or bilateral agreement. Yet
the “declinations with disgorgement” issued under the Pilot Pro-
gram represent contractual arrangements between the government
and the defendant, wherein the defendant will pay “disgorgement”
in order for the government to agree to abandon its investigation.
Moreover, the term “disgorgement” means dispossession of ill-got-
ten gains and is historically a judicial remedy in equity. In the
dispositions settled by only the DOJ in the Pilot Program, disgorge-
ment is wholly inappropriate because it is not a punitive remedy
available to the DOJ in conjunction with a declination.
To the cynical observer, these “declination with disgorgement”
cases are the equivalent of a corporation “buying” a declination in a
corruption case with the disgorgement amount representing
merely the cost of doing international business. Seen from another
point of view, these dispositions could be viewed as examples of
governmental extortion—if these “disgorgement” amounts are not
6. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996).
7. See infra Parts III and IV and accompanying notes.
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paid, the government will threaten to continue the investigation
and even will threaten possible prosecution. The problems with ei-
ther of these scenarios should be obvious. If the government can
prove that illegal activity is occurring, the government should be
enforcing the law and awarding appropriate punitive measures; if
the government cannot prove that illegal activity is occurring, com-
panies should not be required to pay in order to avoid the
continued threat of fines and prosecution.
Finally, this Article will address the theoretical issue with the mis-
use of the terms “declination” and “disgorgement” in relation to
the expressive function of law. In Part III, this Article describes the
longstanding history of the expressive theory and applies the theory
to declinations with disgorgement. This Part discusses the signals
and messages sent when the government makes a seemingly schizo-
phrenic choice to decline prosecution and strict enforcement of
the FCPA, while simultaneously demanding disgorgement of alleg-
edly ill-gotten gains. Part IV takes a deeper dive into expressive
theory and legal hermeneutics by arguing that the misuse of legal
terms jumbles the legal lexicon and renders incomprehensible any
communication among stakeholders. This Part concludes by offer-
ing proposals to reduce the risk of abuse inherent in declinations
with disgorgement and other pretrial diversion measures.
I. THE FCPA
This section will address the scope of statutory authority under
the FCPA, as is necessary for a foundational understanding of the
expressive function of this particular law. Part A outlines the statu-
tory jurisdictional and penalty scheme of the FCPA. Part B details
the rise of FCPA enforcement actions and trends. Part C analyzes
the recent settlement strategies in the form of DPAs, NPAs, and the
DOJ Pilot Program.
A. Statutory Authority and Limits of the FCPA
In 1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,8
aimed at eradicating bribery occurring overseas for the purpose of
8. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S. Code). The FCPA (“the Act”) has been
amended twice since its passage. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff
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obtaining business.9 Specifically, the FCPA prohibits the corrupt
use of the mail or any other instrumentality of interstate commerce
“in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authoriza-
tion of the payment of money” or any other thing of value to any
person, with the knowledge that “all or some of the payment will be
offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to [a] foreign offi-
cial” to influence or induce the foreign official to either commit an
act in violation of his or her lawful duty or to secure an improper
advantage in obtaining or retaining business.10 In addition to the
anti-bribery provision, the FCPA also includes accounting provi-
sions. Among the FCPA accounting provisions, the books and
records provision requires issuers to make and maintain accurate
books, records, and accounts.11 Likewise, the internal controls pro-
vision requires that issuers devise and maintain reasonable internal
accounting controls aimed at preventing and detecting FCPA
violations.12
The jurisdictional reach of the statute is global, meaning that it
applies to activity occurring within the United States as well as to
conduct that takes place exclusively in foreign countries.13 Under
the FCPA’s statutory framework, only the DOJ has criminal enforce-
ment authority, yet both the DOJ and the SEC have civil
enforcement authority.14 According to the FCPA Guidance, the
“DOJ may pursue civil actions for anti-bribery violations by domestic
concerns (and their officers, directors, employees, agents, or stock-
holders) and foreign nationals and companies for violations while
in the United States,”15 whereas the SEC may pursue civil actions
(1994)); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)–(3), 78ff (2012)).
9. The legislative history of the FCPA makes clear that Congress, in the wake of the
Watergate scandal, passed the measure intending to shore up corporate accountability by
requiring transparency within corporate books and records. See Karen E. Woody, Securities
Laws as Foreign Policy, 15 NEV. L.J. 297, 307–09 (2014). The measure was spearheaded by the
SEC and initially focused only on corporate record-keeping, but was expanded by Congress
to include anti-bribery as its focus. Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 954 (2012); Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A
Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its 20th Birthday, 18 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 269,
271–75 (1998). .
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a) (2012).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (2012).
14. Id.
15. DOJ, CRIMINAL DIV. & SEC, ENF’T DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 69 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA GUIDANCE], https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf. According to the FCPA
Guidance, the DOJ has exercised this civil authority in limited circumstances in the last thirty
years. Id. at 117 n.357; see, e.g., United States v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono, 4:01-
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against issuers and their officers, directors, employees, agents, or
stockholders for violations of the anti-bribery and the accounting
provisions.”16 The agencies often work together to simultaneously
bring criminal and civil proceedings against an entity.17
The FCPA contains very specific guidelines and penalties for vio-
lations of both the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the
Act.18 An entity’s criminal violation of the anti-bribery provision
may result in a fine of up to $2 million per violation.19 Likewise, an
individual may face up to five years in prison and/or a fine of
$250,000 per violation of the anti-bribery provision.20 For criminal
violations of the accounting provisions, entities can be assessed
fines up to $25 million,21 and individuals may face up to twenty
years in prison and/or fines up to $5 million.22 In addition, under
the Alternative Fines Act, courts may impose higher penalties than
those that are statutorily provided by the FCPA.23
cv-03105, (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2013/08/16/kpmg-siddharta-siddharta-final-judgement.pdf (entry of injunc-
tion barring company from future FCPA violations based on allegations that company paid
bribes to Indonesian tax official in order to reduce the company’s tax assessment); United
States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 99-cv-12566 (D. Mass. 1999) (entry of injunction barring
company from future FCPA violations and requiring maintenance of compliance program
based on allegations that it paid excessive marketing and promotional expenses such as
airfare, travel expenses, and per diem to an Egyptian official and his family); United States v.
Am. Totalisator Co., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.067 (D. Md. 1993) (entry of injunction barring com-
pany from future FCPA violations based on allegations that it paid money to its Greek agent
with knowledge that all or some of the money paid would be offered, given, or promised to
Greek foreign officials in connection with sale of company’s system and spare parts); United
States v. Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc., 3 FCPA Rep. 698.6914 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (entry of injunction
barring company from future FCPA violations based on allegations that employees of the
company participated in bribery scheme to pay foreign officials of Saskatchewan’s state-
owned transportation company $50,000 CAD in connection with sale of buses); United States
v. Carver, 2 FCPA Rep. 645 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (entry of injunction barring company from fu-
ture FCPA violations based on allegations that Carver and Holley, officers and shareholders
of Holcar Oil Corp., paid $1.5 million to Qatar foreign official to secure an oil drilling con-
cession agreement); United States v. Kenny Int’l Corp., 2 FCPA Rep. 649 (D.D.C. 1979) (in
conjunction with criminal proceeding, entry of injunction barring company from future
FCPA violations for providing illegal financial assistance to political party to secure renewal
of stamp distribution agreement).
16. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 69–70.
17. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL NORMS 42 (2005).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e), 78ff (2012).
19. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A).
20. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (b)(3), (e)
(2012) (criminal fining authority that supersedes FCPA-specific fine provisions).
21. § 78ff(a).
22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2012). The fine can be as much as twice the pecuniary gain
that the defendant obtained by making the corrupt payment, provided the government can
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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Penalties assessed under the SEC civil enforcement authority are
typically much smaller than those of its criminal counterpart. As
discussed below, this penalty limitation may be part of the reason
the SEC has opted to demand disgorgement, often in addition to a
fine, in nearly every enforcement action it has pursued in the last
decade.24 The SEC has discretion to impose a fine, seek injunctive
relief, or do both.25 For violations of the anti-bribery provisions, the
SEC may fine both entities and individuals up to $16,000 per viola-
tion.26 For violations of the accounting provisions, the SEC may
demand a civil penalty not to exceed the greater of (a) the gross
amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant or (b) a specified dollar
limitation based on the egregiousness of the violation, ranging
from $5,000 to $100,000 for an individual and $50,000 to $500,000
for a company.27
The clearly delineated penalty scheme set forth in the FCPA is of
the utmost importance when analyzing cases in which the SEC and
the DOJ strayed from the statutorily-authorized penalties and re-
quired disgorgement. This concept is addressed below.
B. FCPA Enforcement Trends
Although enacted in 1977, the FCPA was an oft-overlooked stat-
ute, at least in terms of enforcement, until the 2000s.28 From its
enactment in 1977 until 2001, the SEC brought only nine enforce-
ment actions under the FCPA.29 The DOJ brought, on average,
three cases per year during that same time period.30 Since those
original cases, the FCPA industry, which includes both regulators
and defense counsel, has enjoyed a boom that has not yet waned. In
2001 alone, the SEC brought five enforcement actions, including
24. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 907, 981
(2010).
25. See DEMING, supra note 17, at 44–45.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)–(2)(B), 78dd-3(e)(1)–(2)(B), 78ff(c)(1)–(2)(B) (2012).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2012).
28. See, e.g., Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA
Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393 (2011).
29. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/
fcpa-cases.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20171124192557/https://www.sec.gov/spot
light/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). Note that this list includes only the
SEC enforcement actions and not the parallel DOJ proceedings that occurred in many of
these cases.
30. See Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1447, 1449 (2008).
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one administrative proceeding.31 Correspondingly, the DOJ
brought seven cases in 2001.32 In 2007, as an example, the SEC’s
enforcement actions under the FCPA rose to eighteen.33 In 2010,
the SEC created a specialized unit in its Enforcement Division that
is devoted solely to FCPA matters.34 Likewise, in 2010, the SEC
brought twenty-six enforcement actions, and the DOJ brought
forty-eight.35 Since 2007, there have been at least eight SEC enforce-
ment actions each year, and the number skyrocketed to thirty-two
in 2016.36 The number of DOJ enforcement actions have not dip-
ped below ten since 2007, which rose to twenty-one in 2016.37 The
following table provides data on the enforcement actions taken
since 2007.38
31. SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 29. The administrative proceeding was brought
against Chiquita Brands International. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
44902 (Oct. 3, 2001). Two major cases in 2001 included KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Har-
sono and Baker Hughes. The SEC brought follow-on actions against individuals in both of
these matters. See SEC v. Mattson, No. 4:01-cv-03106 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2002), https://
www.scribd.com/doc/83019022/SEC-v-Eric-Mattson-and-James-Harris; United States v.
KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono, 4:01-cv-03105, (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2001), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/08/16/kpmg-siddharta-sid-
dharta-final-judgement.pdf.
32. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Related Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2001,
DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions-chronologi-
cal-list-2001 [https://web.archive.org/web/20171124194818/https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions-chronological-list-2001] (last visited Nov. 1,
2017).
33. SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 29. These cases included three administrative pro-
ceedings against Dow Chemical Co., Delta & Pine Land Co. and Turk Deltapine, Inc., and
Gioacchino De Cherico & Immucor, Inc. Id.
34. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs
and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2010/2010-5.htm.
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NUMBER OF FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS PER YEAR
The fines associated with FCPA violations rose as quickly as the
number of enforcement actions. The largest total combined pen-
alty associated with an FCPA enforcement action occurred in 2017
against Telia Company AB (“Telia action”).39 Prior to the Telia ac-
tion, the largest penalty for an FCPA enforcement action was $800
million which was levied against Siemens Aktiengesellschaft in
2008.40 The following five largest penalties include three that oc-
curred in 2016: $772 million against Alstom (2014);41 $579 million
against KBR/Halliburton (2009);42 $519 million against Teva
Pharmaceuticals Industries, Ltd. (2016);43 $419 million against
39. Press Release, SEC, Telecommunications Company Paying $965 Million for FCPA
Violations (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-171.
40. SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Siemens AG for
Engaging in Worldwide Bribery With Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of Over $1.6
Billion, Litigation Release No. 20829 (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litre
leases/2008/lr20829.htm.
41. Press Release, DOJ, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal
Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery.
42. SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery; Charges Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc.
with Related Accounting Violations, Litigation Release No. 20897A (Feb. 11, 2009), https://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm.
43. Press Release, DOJ, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Agrees to Pay More than
$283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-million-re
solve-foreign-corrupt.
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Braskem/Odebrecht (2016);44 $412 million against Och-Ziff Capi-
tal Management Group LLC (2016).45 In 2016, the corporate fines
exceeded $2 billion for the first time in the history of the FCPA.46
Importantly, these numbers include the disgorgement amounts
owed to the SEC.
C. Settlement Tools: DPAs, NPAs, and the DOJ Pilot Program
As enforcement actions and fines rose exponentially in the
2000s, companies and the defense bar began to push back on the
government’s broadening scope of the FCPA.47 Corporate liability
in general seemed to be an increasing priority, thanks in part to the
instruction of the DOJ’s Holder Memorandum and the SEC’s Sea-
board Report.48 At that point, the prosecutorial decision was
ultimately a binary one: prosecutors would either bring a charge or
44. Press Release, DOJ, Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and Agree to Pay at Least
$3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery Case in History (Dec. 21,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-
least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve. The total amount listed in the title includes payments
to Brazilian and Swiss authorities. Id.
45. Press Release, DOJ, Och-Ziff Capital Management Admits to Role in Africa Bribery
Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/pr/och-ziff-capital-management-admits-role-africa-bribery-conspiracies-and-
agrees-pay-213.
46. GIBSON DUNN, 2016 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE supra note 35, at 9.
47. See Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corrup-
tion is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1102 (2012). Some of the pushback
was due to the fact that FCPA cases never go to trial but instead are settled or negotiated
behind closed doors in the DOJ or SEC. As a result, the contours or the law are not very
clear. See generally Karen E. Woody, No Smoke and No Fire: The Rise of Internal Controls Absent
Anti-Bribery Violations in FCPA Enforcement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1727, 1756–7 (2017). For in-
stance, what constituted “quid pro quo” was hotly debated as recently as this year, despite
decades of intense enforcement of the statute. See Ben Protess and Alexandra Stevenson,
JPMorgan Chase to Pay $264 Million to Settle Foreign Bribery Case, NY TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 17,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/business/dealbook/jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-
264-million-to-settle-foreign-bribery-charges.html?_r=0.
48. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforce-
ment Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen.,
DOJ, on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF; see also
Paul Larkin, Jr. & John Michael Siebler, All Stick and No Carrot: The Yates Memorandum and
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 STETSON L. REV. 7, 18 (2016) (discussing the expansion of
corporate liability).
The Holder Memorandum provided guidance to DOJ prosecutors regarding factors to
consider when conducting investigations and either bringing charges or negotiating plea
agreements. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, supra. Notably, the Holder memorandum
did not reference any other form of disposition, as DPAs and NPAs had not yet become a tool
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issue a declination. Pretrial alternatives were not on the radar.49
However, the collapse of Arthur Anderson following its criminal
conviction led to a growing acknowledgment that corporate crimi-
nal convictions can be the death knell of companies—which forced
a change in enforcement tactics.50 In response, in 2003, Deputy At-
torney General Thompson issued an official DOJ memorandum,
supplanting the Holder Memorandum, which referenced the op-
tion of pretrial diversion as a consideration in prosecutorial
decisions.51 As a result, alternative pretrial settlement arrangements
such as Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) and Non-Prose-
cution Agreements (“NPAs”) became some of the most oft-used
that the DOJ regularly used when investigating corporations. See generally Mike Koehler, Mea-
suring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 501 (2015).
The Seaboard Report gives a framework for evaluating cooperation by companies, and
details the factors the Commission will consider when granting leniency towards companies
under investigation. SEC Spotlight: Enforcement Cooperation Program, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/enforcement-cooperation-initiative.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20171124
200940/https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enforcement-cooperation-initiative.shtml] (last up-
dated Sept. 20, 2016). The report identifies four broad areas for cooperation:
1. Self-policing prior to the discovery of the misconduct, including establishing effec-
tive compliance procedures and an appropriate tone at the top;
2. Self-reporting of misconduct when it is discovered, including conducting a thor-
ough review of the nature, extent, origins and consequences of the misconduct, and
promptly, completely and effectively disclosing the misconduct to the public, to regu-
latory agencies, and to self-regulatory organizations;
3. Remediation, including dismissing or appropriately disciplining wrongdoers, modi-
fying and improving internal controls and procedures to prevent recurrence of the
misconduct, and appropriately compensating those adversely affected; and
4. Cooperation with law enforcement authorities, including providing the Commis-
sion staff with all information relevant to the underlying violations and the company’s
remedial efforts.
Id.
49. See Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution, supra note 48, at 500–01.
50. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Inte-
grated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014).
51. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) (The Thompson Memorandum was
superseded by the Filip Memorandum, which explicitly referred to non-prosecution agree-
ments and deferred prosecution agreements as “occupy[ing] an important middle ground
between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation”); see Memo-
randum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memorandum], http://www. jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf. But see Peter
Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 163 (2008). (showing that DPAs for individual prosecu-
tions have existed for a number of decades).
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negotiation and settlement tools for both corporations and prose-
cutors alike.52
At present, DPAs and NPAs represent the primary legal mecha-
nism for concluding enforcement actions against corporate
defendants.53 DPAs and NPAs are just as pervasive in FCPA disposi-
tions, with a growing acknowledgment of the strict liability nature
of the statute54 and the view of corporations and the defense bar
that compliance programs may not catch every possible violation of
the FCPA.55 Importantly, DPAs and NPAs are not used solely by the
DOJ; DPAs and NPAs became tools in the SEC’s arsenal for FCPA
enforcement in 2010, when the agency announced a cooperation
initiative.56 In addition to the use of DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ
adopted a Pilot Program in 2016, discussed herein.
1. Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs)
A DPA is a formal agreement wherein the government files
charging documents with the court, but thereby agrees to defer
prosecution, provided the defendant agrees and complies with the
terms and conditions of the DPA.57 The agreement itself is publicly
filed and typically requires the defendant to pay a monetary pen-
alty, agree to waive the statute of limitations, admit to various facts
52. See Cunningham, supra note 50; Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA
Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2011).
53. See generally Cunningham, supra note 50.
54. See, e.g., Irinia Sivachanko, Note, Corporate Victims of “Victimless Crime”: How the FCPA’s
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance, 54
B.C. L. REV. 393, 403 (2013).
55. Cunningham, supra note 50, at 41. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 928 (2007); F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutrous, Deferred
Prosecution Agreements: A View from the Trenches and a Proposal for Reform, 93 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
121 (2007).
56. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and Com-
panies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations, (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2010/2010-6.htm; Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement
with Ralph Lauren Corp. Involving FCPA Misconduct (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2013-2013-65htm. The SEC entered into its first DPA with Tenaris in
2011, and Tenaris paid $5.4 million in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest. Press Re-
lease, SEC, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(May 11, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112.htm. Yet outside of the
three cases associated with the Pilot Program, the SEC has required disgorgement pursuant
to an NPA only once, in the case of Ralph Lauren. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces
Non-Prosecution Agreement with Ralph Lauren Corp. Involving FCPA Misconduct, supra.
57. See Garrett, supra note 55 at 927–28 (defining DPA agreements in the context of
court review when the DOJ unilaterally terminates them); see also FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note
15, at 74.
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included in the agreement describing the conduct at issue, and co-
operate with the government.58 At the end of the term of the
agreement, which is typically between eighteen months and three
years, the government moves to dismiss the charges, and the defen-
dant company is able to settle the allegations without a criminal
conviction or guilty plea on its record.59 Although DPAs are filed in
court, the judicial review of the agreement is minimal, and often
amounts to “rubber-stamp” approval.60
Prior to 2003, the DOJ used a DPA to settle enforcement actions
fewer than twenty-five times.61 Since 2003, however, the boom over
the use of DPAs has not dissipated, with over 200 signed since
2003.62 The first DPA for an FCPA allegation was agreed to in
2005.63 For the FCPA enforcement in particular, DPAs remain an
oft-used settlement approach.64 DPAs are attractive to both the gov-
ernment and the companies. For companies, it is an avenue in
which they can resolve potential FCPA violations without a finding
of guilt. A guilty plea can result in collateral consequences such as
ineligibility to bid for government or World Bank contracts, for ex-
ample. For the government, DPAs represent an easier way to reach
58. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 74 (“DPAs describe the company’s conduct,
cooperation, and remediation, if any, and provide a calculation of the penalty pursuant to
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.”).
59. Id.
60. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME 28 (2009),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf. The “rubber stamp” approval became even
more entrenched after a recent D.C. Circuit opinion slapping down Judge Leon of the Dis-
trict of Columbia District Court. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir.
2016). Judge Leon rejected the DPA, stating that it would “undermine the public’s confi-
dence in the administration of justice and promote disrespect for the law for [society] to see
a defendant prosecuted so anemically for engaging in such egregious conduct for such a
sustained period of time . . . .” United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167
(D.D.C. 2015). The D.C. Circuit reversed Judge Leon’s holding that the judiciary cannot
second-guess the Executive Branch’s charging authority and preferences. Fokker Servs, 818
F.3d at 749–50; see also GIBSON DUNN, 2016 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATION NON-PROSECU-
TION AGREEMENTS (NPAS) AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (DPAS) 9 (2017)
[hereinafter GIBSON DUNN, UPDATE ON NPAS AND DPAS], http://www.gibsondunn.com/pub
lications/documents/2016-Year-End-Update-Corporate-NPA-and-DPA.pdf; Cunningham,
supra note 50, at 46.
61. Cunningham, supra note 50, at 19. See generally GIBSON DUNN, UPDATE ON NPAS AND
DPAS, supra note 60.
62. See Data & Documents, CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Gar
rett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2017) (enter
“DP” in the search field “Disposition Result”).
63. Press Release, DOJ, Monsanto Company Charged with Bribing Indonesian Govern-
ment Official: Prosecution Deferred for Three Years (Jan. 6, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2005/January/05_crm_008.htm.
64. See generally GIBSON DUNN, YEAR UPDATE ON NPAS AND DPAS, supra note 60.
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a resolution, while still extracting a fine. In addition, the govern-
ment is able to keep the door open for further prosecution if the
company is unable to meet the terms of the DPA.
2. Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs)
Under an NPA, the DOJ maintains the right to file charges but
refrains from doing so to allow the company to demonstrate its
good conduct during the term of the NPA. Unlike a DPA, an NPA is
not filed with a court but is instead maintained by the parties in the
form of a letter agreement: “The requirements of an NPA are simi-
lar to those of a DPA and generally require a waiver of the statute of
limitations, ongoing cooperation, admission of the material facts,
and compliance and remediation commitments, in addition to pay-
ment of a monetary penalty.”65 If the company complies with the
agreement throughout its term, the DOJ does not file criminal
charges. Because NPAs are not filed in court, “there is absolutely no
judicial scrutiny of [the agreement] . . . [meaning] there is no inde-
pendent review [of the government’s findings or conclusions]
. . . .”66
Interestingly, the first pretrial resolution in FCPA enforcement
occurred in 2004 and came in the form of an NPA rather than a
DPA.67 Like DPAs, NPAs saw a sharp uptick in FCPA enforcement
since that date. In 2016 alone, for example, the government en-
tered into twenty-one NPAs in total, with six of those related to
FCPA allegations.68 NPAs are a powerful tool in that both the gov-
ernment and the regulated companies see the merits of this pretrial
diversion. The DOJ is able to extract a fine pursuant to the agree-
ment with potentially fewer resources expended on investigation,69
companies are able to “walk away” without any finding of guilt and
65. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 75.
66. Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution, supra note 48, at 505.
67. See Press Release, DOJ, Invision Technologies, Inc. Enters into Agreement with the
United States (Dec. 6, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/December/
04_crm_780.htm.
68. GIBSON DUNN, UPDATE ON NPAS AND DPAS, supra note 60 at 1; see, e.g., Richard Cas-
sin, Tenet Healthcare Pays $513 Million for Fraud and Kickbacks, Whistleblower Awarded $84 Million,
FCPA BLOG (Oct. 7, 2016, 8:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/10/7/tenet-
healthcare-pays-513-million-for-fraud-and-kickbacks-wh.html; Press Release, DOJ, PTC Inc.
Subsidiaries Agree to Pay More Than $14 Million to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Feb.
16, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ptc-inc-subsidiaries-agree-pay-more-14-million-re
solve-foreign-bribery-charges.
69. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Two Non-Prosecution Agreements in FCPA
Cases (June 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-109.html (“When com-
panies self-report and lay all their cards on the table, non-prosecution agreements are an
284 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:2
also without a proverbial sword of Damocles hanging over their
heads in the form of a DPA.70
3. DOJ Pilot Program
Entering into this current FCPA enforcement landscape of
skyrocketing fines and disgorgement amounts, increased enforce-
ment efforts, and an uptick in pretrial settlement agreements, was
the DOJ’s Pilot Program, which was enacted in April 2016. As stated
in the memorandum outlining the program, the “principal goal . . .
is to promote greater accountability for individuals and companies
that engage in corporate crime by motivating companies to volunta-
rily self-disclose FCPA-related misconduct, fully cooperate with the
Fraud Section, and, where appropriate, remediate flaws in their
controls and compliance programs.”71 In addition, the goals of the
Pilot Program are to further deter individuals and companies from
engaging in FCPA violations, encourage strong compliance pro-
grams, and “increase the Fraud Section’s ability to prosecute
individual wrongdoers . . . .”72
The Pilot Program memorandum sets out finite requirements
companies must meet before being eligible for mitigation credit.73
effective way to get the money back and save the government substantial time and resources
while crediting extensive cooperation . . . .”).
70. Under a DPA, companies are closely watched by the government. In fact, companies
under DPAs have reporting requirements, and some may even have corporate monitors in
place. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 71.
71. PILOT PROGRAM MEMO, supra note 1, at 2.
72. Id. The emphasis on individual liability in addition to corporate liability comes on
the heels of the 2015 Yates Memorandum, referenced in the Pilot Program Memo. Memoran-
dum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, on Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memo], https://www.justice.gov/
archives/dag/file/769036/download; see also PILOT PROGRAM MEMO, supra note 1, at 2 (refer-
encing the 2015 Yates Memorandum). The “Yates Memo,” as it has come to be called, stresses
six areas of focus for the DOJ and SEC in investigating individuals for corporate wrongdoing.
Yates Memo, supra, at 2–3. They are as follows: (1) corporations will be eligible for coopera-
tion credit only if they provide DOJ with “all relevant facts” relating to all individuals
responsible for misconduct, regardless of seniority level; (2) both criminal and civil DOJ
investigations will focus on investigating individuals “from the inception of the investigation”;
(3) criminal and civil DOJ attorneys should be in routine communication with each other,
notifying civil counterparts when conduct giving rise to potential individual liability is discov-
ered; (4) the DOJ will not agree to a corporate resolution that provides immunity to
potentially culpable individuals unless there are extraordinary circumstances present; (5) the
DOJ will have a clear plan to resolve open investigations of individuals when the case against
a corporation is resolved; and (6) civil attorneys, in addition to criminal attorneys, should
focus on individuals and take into account issues such as accountability and deterrence, as
well as ability to pay fines. Id.
73. PILOT PROGRAM MEMO, supra note 1, at 3–9.
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The first requirement is timely, voluntary self-disclosure. The disclo-
sure must occur “prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or
government investigation”;74 it must occur “within a reasonably
prompt time after becoming aware of the offense”;75 and the disclo-
sure must be fulsome.76 Second, the company must cooperate fully
in all FCPA matters, which means that it must provide ongoing dis-
closure of the facts relevant to the wrongdoing at issue;77 preserve,
collect, and disclose all relevant documents; provide updates and
disclose relevant facts discovered in the corporate internal investi-
gation;78 make employees available for interviews by the
government;79 facilitate third-party production of documents from
foreign jurisdictions and provide translations as necessary.80 Third,
companies must perform timely and appropriate remediation,
which includes implementation of an effective compliance and eth-
ics program;81 appropriate discipline of employees responsible for
misconduct;82 and any additional measures the company believes
would identify future risks and would demonstrate the recognition
of the seriousness of misconduct.83
If the above requirements are met, companies are eligible for
mitigation credit.84 According to the Pilot Program memorandum,
mitigation credit can be in the form of a different type of disposi-
tion, a reduction in fine, or not requiring a monitor.85 The
requirements of the Pilot Program are not “new” in the sense that
the factors included are omnipresent in the 2012 FCPA Guidance
issued by the DOJ and SEC.86 However, the factors are not simply
74. Id. at 4 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g)(1) (U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM’N 2016)).
75. Id.
76. Id. This includes facts about individuals as well as the corporation. Id.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5–6. Additional factors for cooperation include de-confliction of internal inves-
tigation, if necessary, and disclosure of any criminal activity. Id. at 5. The Pilot Program
Memo also states that cooperation may be different depending on the size of the company
and related expenses for cooperation. Id. at 5 n.4.
81. Id. at 7. The compliance program criteria may vary among companies but must in-
clude: (1) “a culture of compliance and awareness among employees that criminal conduct
. . . will not be tolerated”; (2) dedication of sufficient resources to compliance; (3) high-
quality and experienced personnel in compliance who can identify risks; (4) independence
among compliance personnel and corporate managers; (5) auditing of compliance program;
(6) valid reporting structure from compliance to the management. Id.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 3.
86. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15 at 52–63.
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suggestions or “best practices,” but are requirements for eligibility
in the Pilot Program itself.
To date, the DOJ has highlighted on its website seven companies
that have received declinations from the DOJ in conjunction with
the Pilot Program.87 Three of these seven companies have dis-
gorged profits to the SEC under the parameters of the Program in
return for a declination from the DOJ.88 Of these three, two dis-
gorged profits pursuant to NPAs with the SEC,89 and the third
disgorged profits pursuant to a cease-and-desist order.90
In other words, the first three dispositions undertaken with the
Pilot Program involved a clear declination from the DOJ but also
included a corollary agreement with the SEC that involved dis-
gorgement of profits.
But in September 2016, the DOJ granted two “declinations with
disgorgement” under its Pilot Program for which the DOJ author-
ized both the declination and the disgorgement.91 These
declinations were awarded to two private Texas-based companies,
HMT LLC and NCH Corp., who are not issuers and therefore fall
outside of the SEC’s FCPA jurisdiction. Arguably because of this
lack of SEC jurisdiction, the DOJ opted to conflate its role and the
SEC’s by issuing the novel “declination with disgorgement.”
In its letter to counsel for HMT LLC, the DOJ stated that its in-
vestigation found that the company, through its employees and
agents, had paid bribes to government officials in both Venezuela
and China in order to influence those officials’ purchasing deci-
sions.92 Specifically, the DOJ alleged that HMT sales agents illegally
paid $500,000 in bribes disguised as agents’ commissions or subcon-
tracting fees to government officials in Venezuela.93 In China, an
HMT subsidiary engaged a distributor who “paid bribes on almost
all transactions in China.”94 The letter to HMT’s counsel detailing
the declination states that the DOJ would be closing its investiga-
tion into HMT because of HMT’s voluntary self-disclosure, its full
87. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pilot Program, Declinations, DOJ, https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/pilot-program/declinations (last updated June 29, 2017).
88. These companies are Nortek, Inc., Akamai Technologies, Inc., and Johnson Con-
trols, Inc. See sources cited supra note 3.
89. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Two Non-Prosecution Agreements in FCPA
Cases, supra note 69 (detailing the agreements that required Akamai Technologies and
Nortek Inc. to disgorge profits related to bribes paid to Chinese officials by foreign
subsidiaries).
90. Johnson Controls, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78287, 2016 WL 4363463 (July 11,
2016).
91. Letter to HMT, LLC, supra note 4; Letter to NCH, Corp., supra note 4.
92. Letter to HMT, LLC, supra note 4 at 1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2.
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cooperation, its comprehensive global investigation, the remedial
steps that HMT took (including its robust compliance program),
and HMT’s agreement to disgorge all profits it made from the ille-
gal conduct, totaling $2,719,412 to the DOJ.95
Likewise, in the case of NCH Corporation, the DOJ’s letter to
counsel uses the exact same language regarding why the DOJ would
cease its investigation into NCH’s subsidiary in China that “illegally
provided things of value . . . to Chinese government officials.”96 The
DOJ alleged that NCH’s subsidiary in China provided “things of
value,” including gifts, meals, and entertainment, worth $44,545 to
Chinese government officials.97 These bribes were recorded in
NCH’s books as “customer maintenance fees,” “customer coopera-
tion fees,” and “cash to customer.”98 In addition, NCH paid
expenses for several employees of an NCH China customer during
a ten-day trip to the U.S. and Canada when only one-half day in-
volved business-related activities. For NCH, the DOJ required
$335,342 in disgorgement.99
The declinations granted to NCH and HMT in September 2016
represented the first of DOJ’s novel “declinations with disgorge-
ment” program. Since then, the DOJ has continued this practice
and awarded two other companies “declinations with disgorge-
ment” in the first half of 2017.100
Obviously, one major distinction between these latter declina-
tions and the other three from the Pilot Program is the fact that the
DOJ demanded disgorgement. In addition, these declination letters
for NCH, HMT, and Linde required the companies’ consent.101
The signature of counsel indicates that counsel agrees to the brief
statement of facts provided in the letter. Indeed, many have sug-
gested that these “declinations with disgorgement” are in fact
NPAs,102 a point that will be discussed below. These DOJ disposi-
tions are a novel concept but create a legal and theoretical morass
with the oxymoronic phrase “declination with disgorgement.”
95. Id.
96. Letter to NCH, Corp., supra note 4 at 1.Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Letter from Nicola J. Mrazek to Nathaniel B. Edmonds, supra note 5; Letter from
Lauren N. Perkins to Lucina Low & Thomas Best, supra note 5.
101. Letter to HMT, LLC, supra note 4, at 3; Letter to NCH, Corp., supra note 4, at 2.;
Letter from Nicola J. Mrazek to Nathaniel B. Edmonds, supra note 5; Letter from Lauren N.
Perkins to Lucina Low & Thomas Best, supra note 5.
102. See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN, 2016 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE, supra note 35, at 6 (“We have
determined to count these declination letter agreements, where they are countersigned by
the company with agreements to the alleged facts and to disgorge illicit gains, as enforce-
ment actions for statistical purposes. Although we understand there could be a different view
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II. “DECLINATIONS WITH DISGORGEMENT”
In order to understand why the phrase “declination with dis-
gorgement” is inherently oxymoronic, one must first dissect the
phrase into its terms, “declination” and “disgorgement.” This sec-
tion discusses the historical roots of the terms and their practical
usage in FCPA enforcement. This section concludes with an analysis
regarding why a “declination with disgorgement” is both inappro-
priate and should not be available to the DOJ and discusses the
dangerous, practical ramifications of these dispositions.
A. “Declination”
A declination from the government is a decision to “conclude
formal and informal investigations into potential violations of the
FCPA without bringing enforcement actions.”103 In essence, it is the
use of prosecutorial discretion to decline further action—a deci-
sion driven by certain factors including, perhaps, a realization that
the charges could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.104 As
noted above, prior to the rapid rise of DPAs and NPAs in FCPA
actions, the prosecutorial decision-making was essentially a binary
exercise: charge a company (and/or enter into plea negotiations)
or decline to prosecute further.105
taken toward counting a so-called declination of prosecution as an enforcement action, these
letter agreements bear significant similarities to other types of agreements (including DOJ
and SEC non-prosecution agreements and SEC administrative proceedings) that we have
been counting for statistical purposes for the 12 years we have been tracking FCPA enforce-
ment. In our view, a company forced to pay hundreds of thousands or even millions of
dollars to the U.S. Treasury as a result of publicized admissions to conduct that amounts to
an FCPA violation has undergone a significant enforcement event that we believe warrants
tracking.”).
103. James G. Tillen & Marc Alain Bohn, Declinations During the FCPA Boom, 2 BLOOMBERG
L. REP.—CORP. COUNS., no. 8, 2011, at 1, 1, https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/
files/news_updates/attached_files/miller_chevalier_tillen_bohn_article.pdf.
104. All criminal charges require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American
scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’”) (quoting Coffin v. United States,
156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
105. See Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution, supra note 48, at 503–08. Koehler
looks to the Filip Memorandum of 2008, in which one finds the first discussion of DPAs and
NPAs as pretrial options. Id. at 507–509 The Filip Memorandum states:
[I]t may be appropriate to consider a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agree-
ment with conditions designed, among other things, to promote compliance with
applicable law and to prevent recidivism. Such agreements are a third option, besides
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1. Criteria for Declination in FCPA Enforcement
Declinations in FCPA enforcement, prior to the Pilot Program,
were difficult to analyze given that they often were not publicized
by either the DOJ or SEC. Nevertheless, in its FCPA Guidance, the
DOJ has outlined the factors involved for considering a declination.
These decisions are to be made pursuant to the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations.106 According to the Principles,
prosecutors should consider ten factors when deciding whether to
prosecute:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the
risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies and
priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corpora-
tions for particular categories of crime;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the
wrongdoing by corporate management;
3. the corporation’s history of similar misconduct, includ-
ing prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement
actions against it;
4. the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investi-
gation of its agents;
5. the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-
existing compliance program;
6. the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing;
a criminal indictment, on the one hand, and a declination, on the other. Declining
prosecution may allow a corporate criminal to escape without consequences. Ob-
taining a conviction may produce a result that seriously harms innocent third parties
who played no role in the criminal conduct. Under appropriate circumstances, a de-
ferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement can help restore the integrity of a
company’s operations and preserve the financial viability of a corporation that has
engaged in criminal conduct, while preserving the government’s ability to prosecute a
recalcitrant corporation that materially breaches the agreement. Such agreements
achieve other important objectives as well, like prompt restitution for victims. Ulti-
mately, the appropriateness of a criminal charge against a corporation, or some lesser
alternative, must be evaluated in a pragmatic and reasoned way that produces a fair
outcome, taking into consideration, among other things, the Department’s need to
promote and ensure respect for the law.
Filip Memorandum, supra note 51, at 18.
106. DOJ, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-28.000–.1500 (2015), https://www.
justice.gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual. For individuals, prosecutors are to refer-
ence the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See id. § 9-27.000.
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7. the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts
to implement an effective corporate compliance pro-
gram or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the
relevant government agencies;
8. collateral consequences, including whether there is dis-
proportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders,
employees, and others not proven personally culpable, as
well as impact on the public arising from the
prosecution;
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory en-
forcement actions; and
10. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsi-
ble for the corporation’s malfeasance.107
Importantly, the decision whether or not to award a declination
does not, and should not, turn on whether the company pays back
any or all of its allegedly ill-gotten gains. That is, there is not any
quid pro quo in order to obtain a declination, for reasons set out in
Part II-C.108
The list of factors to be used in deciding whether to prosecute
provides an abstract rubric for stakeholders to understand what cor-
porate conduct will be evaluated. However, prior to the Pilot
Program’s declinations, neither the DOJ nor the SEC typically pub-
licized declinations. In addition, nearly every corporate FCPA
enforcement matter to date has been settled outside of court, so
there is little public record for companies to reference when con-
sidering what conduct may or may not elicit investigation.109 The
most transparency the DOJ and SEC provided prior to the Pilot
Program was a list of six examples of companies to which the agen-
cies had provided declinations.110 For each of the six companies,
the FCPA Guidance lays out in bullet-point form the factors that
were taken into consideration for that particular company to obtain
107. Id. § 9-28.300.
108. See, e.g., Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experi-
ment in Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 307, 312 (2015) (noting
that a declination is “walking away and doing nothing”).
109. See generally Woody, No Smoke and No Fire, supra note 47.
110. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 77–79.
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a declination.111 Out of the six examples illustrated in the Gui-
dance, however, not a single one included any mention of the
company’s payment of disgorgement or restitution.112
2. “Declinations” in Conjunction with the Pilot Program
Importantly, unlike a DPA or NPA, a declination is not an agree-
ment between two parties but is instead a unilateral decision. In
other words, a declination is entirely under the control of the gov-
ernment and does not demand any simultaneous action by the
company under investigation in order to secure it. To be sure, cer-
tain pre-existing factors may influence whether a company secures a
declination. However, those pre-existing conditions are antecedents
to the decision not to prosecute and do not occur as consideration
in an agreement with the government for a declination. The Pilot
Program disastrously conflates declinations with the principles of
an NPA by requiring disgorgement in order to secure the declina-
tion. This bastardizes the term “declination.” As noted above, these
“declinations” instead are actually NPAs in disguise, which begs the
question of why the DOJ refers to these as declinations at all.113 The
declination letters in the cases themselves make clear that the gov-
ernment was treating the declination more as an NPA. Unlike the
declination letters for the first three companies in the Pilot Pro-
gram, the letters for NCH, HMT, Linde NA, and CDM Smith
included a longer summary of “facts” that the government al-
leged.114 These declinations with disgorgement also required
signatures from defendants’ counsel, meaning there is an implied
admission to the facts as laid out in the declination letter. If these
dispositions are actually NPAs in practicality, then the DOJ has the
authority to demand a criminal fine pursuant to the agreement, as
it has done many times before when entering into NPAs and
DPAs.115 Unfortunately, a criminal fine cannot be exacted when the
government decides to decline to either continue investigation or
proceed with prosecution, as the DOJ claimed it would in the decli-
nations with disgorgement matters. A declination with strings
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See infra Part III (addressing this question).
114. See sources cited supra note 4.
115. In such a situation, a criminal fine would be entirely distinct from disgorgement as
the term has historically been used. See infra Part II-B.
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attached, however, is not a declination. The practical and theoreti-
cal implications of this misuse of the term “declination” are vast and
are discussed below.
B. “Disgorgement”
Of all the FCPA enforcement actions to date, the DOJ has not
sought disgorgement from a corporation or individual until its crea-
tion of the Pilot Program.116 Just as the term “declination” was
analyzed above, this Part takes the same approach toward the term
“disgorgement.” Specifically, this Part will address the history of dis-
gorgement as a remedy, the unavailability of disgorgement in a
criminal context, and the use of disgorgement in government
proceedings.
1. History of Disgorgement and its Modern Use in
Government Actions
Disgorgement is a historical remedy, with its roots dating back to
Emperor Justinian.117 At its base, disgorgement means to “strip of
ill-gotten gains.”118 Disgorgement in today’s jurisprudence is
116. The DOJ required restitution from Albert Jackson Stanley, a former officer of Kel-
logg, Brown & Root, Inc., a subsidiary of Halliburton Inc. during the Halliburton/
Snamprogetti/Technip enforcement action related to the Bonny Island, Nigeria, liquefied
natural gas contracts. See Press Release, DOJ, Former Chairman and CEO of Kellogg, Brown
& Root Inc. Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison for Foreign Bribery and Kickback Schemes
(Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-chairman-and-ceo-kellogg-brown-
root-inc-sentenced-30-months-prison-foreign-bribery-and. Stanley entered a guilty plea for his
role in the joint venture and authorizing agents to pay bribes to Nigerian officials. U.S. v.
Stanley, No. 08-CR-597 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2012) (imposing punishment on a guilty plea
entered into on September 3, 2008). Importantly, restitution is quite different from disgorge-
ment, and is often demanded in a criminal matter. See SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802
(1993) (“[Disgorgement] is an equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer from en-
riching himself by his wrongs. Disgorgement does not aim to compensate the victims of the
wrongful acts, as restitution does . . . . [Disgorgement] is not restitution.”) (internal citations
omitted).
117. See JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 45–47 (1951); see
also Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (“Disgorgement of a
defendant’s wrongful gains is an ancient remedy.”).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[Disgorge-
ment] seeks to strip the wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains . . . .”); Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J.
Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement
Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 396 (“Disgorgement is the forfeiture of the ill-
gotten gains received by the defendant.”); see also Disgorgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (“The act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) on demand or
by legal compulsion.”).
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typically understood as a remedy in equity119 and lies within the
core judicial power of a court.120 It is not intended as a punitive
measure nor is it available outside of an equitable resolution.121 De-
spite a reference to disgorgement in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines,122 criminal disgorgement is rarer than its use in civil
matters.123 For this reason, this discussion focuses heavily on the use
of disgorgement in matters of securities law wherein the SEC is a
party to the suit in a civil disposition.
Disgorgement is now seen as a commonplace remedy in SEC en-
forcement,124 but it was not used in conjunction with regulatory
actions until the latter half of the twentieth century.125 The agency
first obtained disgorgement in insider trading case, SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company, despite the fact that Congress had never ex-
plicitly authorized the SEC by statute to seek disgorgement in a
119. Disgorgement historically is understood as a remedy in equity, but some scholars
have argued that it is practically being applied as a remedy at law. See, e.g., Russell Ryan, The
Equity Facade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2013), http://www.hblr
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Ryan__The-Equity-Fa%C3%A7ade-of-SEC-Disgorgeme
nt.pdf. Ryan points out that disgorgement cannot be a remedy in equity in cases where a
defendant does not possess or control any of the tainted profits (either because he has squan-
dered them or profits were redeployed elsewhere), because the defendant is not in a position
to “disgorge” anything. Id. at 2. In these cases, Ryan argues, disgorgement is a remedy at law
because it is an obligation to pay a sum of money to a plaintiff. Id.
120. See, e.g., SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The disgorgement remedy
[the district court judge] approved in this case is, by its very nature, an equitable remedy
. . . .”); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Disgorgement is
an equitable remedy . . . .”); SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of Common Stock of and
Call Options for Common Stock of Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 817 F.2d 1018, 1020 (2d Cir. 1987)
(“The disgorgement remedy approved by the district court in this case is, by its nature, an
equitable remedy.”).
121. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 119, at 12. But see Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639–41
(2017).
122. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.9 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (Dis-
gorgement) (“The court shall add to the fine determined under [the Guideline range] any
gain to the organization from the offense that has not and will not be paid as restitution or by
way of other remedial measures.”).
123. See JAMES T. O’REILLY ET AL., PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME 191–92, 202 (2009) (que-
rying if disgorgement is “A Second-Class Citizen” in criminal statutes and referring to civil
action, “[i]n the majority of statutory or regulatory schemes . . . the courts have found the
authority to impose the fully panoply of equitable remedies including . . . disgorgement”).
O’Reilly points out that it is a congressional priority to have victims paid first (in restitution)
before requiring disgorgement of any additional gains beyond what restitution required. Id.
at 191–92.
124. SEC v. Berlacher, No. 07-3800, 2010 WL 3566790, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010)
(“Disgorgement has become the routine remedy for a securities enforcement action. If a
person is found in violation and has profited from the ensuing transaction, courts generally
order the disgorgement of those profits.”).
125. James Tyler Kirk, Deranged Disgorgement, 8 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & L. 131, 133
(2014); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
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federal court.126 In 1990, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Reform Act allowed the SEC, in an administrative pro-
ceeding, to “enter an order requiring accounting and
disgorgement, including reasonable interest.”127 This marked the
first time the term “disgorgement” appeared as a remedial option
in the securities laws. The availability of disgorgement as an equita-
ble remedy was expanded again in 2002, with the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley.128 The provision in Sarbanes-Oxley inserted a new
amendment into Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, allowing the
SEC to “seek, and any Federal Court may grant, any equitable relief
that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”129
Despite being a commonly-sought remedy in modern civil en-
forcement, disgorgement remains a much-debated concept. The
most recent issue regarding the SEC’s ability to seek disgorgement
is the recent Supreme Court review of a circuit split regarding
whether the five-year statute of limitations applies to disgorge-
ment.130 The case centered on the application of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gabelli v. SEC, in which the Court held that
under 28 U.S.C. § 2462, enforcement actions seeking civil penalties,
fines, or forfeiture must be brought within five years from the date
of when the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred, not when the
fraud was discovered.131 The 2017 Supreme Court case, Kokesh v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, addressed whether claims for dis-
gorgement should be subject to the Gabelli holding.132 The Eleventh
126. 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud
Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641, 642 (1977) (“Nowhere within the statutory
framework of the federal securities laws did Congress provide that the SEC would have the
power to make a violator of the anti-fraud provisions disgorge tainted profits. Nor is there any
direct reference in the legislative history surrounding the passage of the 1933 or 1934 Acts
which would encourage the utilization of such an enforcement tool by the SEC.”) (internal
citations omitted); see also Ryan, supra note 119. Ryan points out that Congress has statutorily
empowered the SEC only to issue injunctions, administrative cease-and-desist orders, mone-
tary penalties, as well as a bars and suspensions. Id. at 2.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(e) (2012). After the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 929, any individual or company can be sued in
an SEC administrative proceeding, whereas before, the jurisdictional reach of the administra-
tive proceedings extended only to broker-dealers and regulated entities. [Citation Needed].
The question as to whether the authority to order disgorgement, in its original meaning, can
be conferred upon administrative judges, meaning non-Article III courts, is one for debate,
but is beyond the scope of this Article.
128. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §305(b), 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2012)).
129. Id.
130. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639–41 (2017).
131. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 446–47 (2013).
132. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1639–41.
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Circuit held that a disgorgement claim is the equivalent of an ac-
tion or suit for forfeiture, meaning that it is subject to the statute of
limitations under § 2462.133 The Tenth Circuit, in Kokesh, held that
disgorgement is not the equivalent of forfeiture.134 The Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that disgorgement is an equitable remedy and should
not be considered a penalty; therefore, disgorgement claims are not
subject to the statute of limitations.135 The Supreme Court ulti-
mately agreed with the logic of the Eleventh Circuit and held that
disgorgement is more akin to a penalty and therefore should be
subject to the statute of limitations.136
Because disgorgement is defined as “ill-gotten gains,”137 the gov-
ernment is only permitted to receive the profits if it can prove that
the disgorgement amount is derived from the allegedly illegal activ-
ities. Anything beyond that amount would be considered a
punishment. In order to calculate disgorgement, the SEC must
identify the causal link between the unlawful activity and the profit
it seeks to disgorge.138 In securities litigation, courts often afford a
significant amount of deference to the SEC’s calculation, given that
profits from illegal activity may be hard to define with particular-
ity.139 As such, the threshold burden of the SEC is to give merely a
“reasonable approximation of [the] profits [which are] causally
connected to the violation.”140 Once the SEC meets this relatively
low threshold, the defendant must rebut the SEC’s calculation and
demonstrate that the government’s disgorgement figure is not, in
fact, a reasonable approximation.141
Despite being only a fairly recently-demanded remedy, disgorge-
ment is by far the largest category of money collected by the SEC.
133. SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2016).
134. SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2016).
135. Id. at 1164.
136. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1645.
137. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
138. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231–32 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
139. See id.
140. Id.; see also Elaine Buckberg & Frederich C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands
and Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. L. 347, 352 (2008) (“[A]lthough few courts have discussed the
concept of netting [finding the net but-for benefit] in the disgorgement context, the princi-
ple is routinely invoked to calculate damages for securities fraud and, logically, the same
principle should apply to disgorgement.”); Ryan, supra note 119, at 4–5 (noting that the
“reasonable approximation” standard is an advantage to the government that is afforded
because disgorgement is considered a remedy in equity rather than a remedy at law).
141. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 1231–32. This is typically done by proving intervening
events or causes affected the calculation of profits. Id. at 1232.
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In fiscal year, 2014, the SEC collected $2.788 billion in disgorge-
ment and half that in penalties, $1.38 billion.142 Because
disgorgement is a remedy rather than a penalty, companies dis-
gorging ill-gotten gains in an SEC proceeding may be able to attain
a tax deduction on the disgorged amount, along with pre-judgment
interest.143 For this reason, companies often negotiate to settle with
a larger disgorgement amount, rather than a larger fine or penalty.
2. Disgorgement in FCPA Enforcement
The literature regarding the SEC’s use of disgorgement focuses
heavily on disgorgement of gains from insider trading,144 with little
ink spilled on disgorgement in FCPA matters. The same is true for
disgorgement demanded by the DOJ, given that the DOJ only re-
cently began using disgorgement in antitrust matters and has never
required disgorgement in FCPA matters until September 2016.145
As described in section I, the FCPA lays out authorized statutory
penalties. Disgorgement is neither included in the statute nor even
mentioned in the original House or Senate reports of 1977, the
discussion regarding its amendments,146 or the 1981 U.S. General
142. SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL YEAR 2014 2 tbl.1 (2014), http://
www.sec.gov/about/secstats2014.pdf.
143. Sasha Kalb & Marc Alain Bohn, Miller & Chevalier LLP, Disgorgement: The Devil You
Don’t Know, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, (Apr. 10, 2010) http://www.corporatecompliancein
sights.com/disgorgement-fcpa-how-applied-calculated/. Because disgorgement is not in-
tended to be a punishment, it does not fall under the exclusion set by the IRS for deductions.
Meaning, absent a finding that disgorgement is the equivalent of civil forfeiture, or a factor
of the punishment, it is a deductible expense. Id.
144. See, e.g., Robert L. Cheney & Daniel M. Sibears, Disgorgement in SEC Insider Trading
Cases: Toward a New Measure of Disgorgement, 26 BOS. B.J. 5 (1982); Thomas C. Mira, Comment,
The Measure of Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions Against Inside Traders Under Rule 10b-5, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 445 (1985); John K. Robinson, Note, A Reconsideration of the Disgorgement
Remedy in Tipper-Tippee Insider Trading Cases, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 432 (1994).
145. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79 (2009);
James Lowe et al., DOJ Seeks Unprecedented Disgorgement Remedy in a Civil Antitrust Case,
WILMERHALE (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsde
tail.aspx?NewsPubId=88585. Disgorgement is often used interchangeably with “restitution,”
particularly in criminal dispositions but there is a significant difference between the two
terms. See O’REILLY, supra note 123, at 196 (“Disgorgement serves a different purpose than
restitution. Restitution is victim specific and is designed to remediate their losses. The
amount of restitution is limited by the amount of loss. The purpose of disgorgement is to
prevent a wrongdoer from profiting by his or her illegal conduct.”). See infra Part II-C.3 and
accompanying notes (discussing the introduction of the use of disgorgement by the DOJ
Pilot Program).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977); see also David C. Weiss, Note,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery
Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 474 (2009).
Weiss writes that “the history surrounding the passage of the FCPA indicates that it is unclear
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Accounting Office Report.147 Yet the SEC has piggybacked on the
expansion of remedies available under Sarbanes-Oxley, including
equitable remedies, despite the explicitly-stated fining authority
found in the FCPA itself.148
The first use of disgorgement in the settlement of an FCPA ac-
tion by the SEC was in 2004, in the case of ABB Ltd.149 Since that
time, the SEC has sought disgorgement in “virtually every FCPA en-
forcement action it has brought.”150 The amount of disgorgement,
like the number of FCPA enforcement actions, has increased over
the past fifteen years.151 In fact, most of the highest amounts of dis-
gorgement extracted by the SEC occurred in the past two years.152
As noted above, when faced with astronomical fines and disgorge-
ment amounts, companies are often more willing to accept the
disgorgement amounts because of the ability to write the amount
off in taxes.
3. DOJ “Disgorgement” in the Pilot Program
The background regarding disgorgement as demanded by the
SEC in FCPA enforcement actions is critical for understanding how
much of a shift in practice it is to have the DOJ demand disgorge-
ment in exchange for a declination. As discussed in section II-A.,
whether Congress intended that the SEC pursue disgorgement in FCPA enforcement. This
fact alone should at least give pause to question the normative function of disgorgement.” Id.
at 496.
147. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., AFMD-81-34, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC-
TICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS (1981).
148. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A) (2012); see also
supra Part I.
149. Consent of Defendant, SEC v. ABB Ltd., 10-CV-01648-PLF (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2010),
http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/3000/001564.pdf; Sec Sues ABB Ltd in Foreign
Bribery Case, Litigation Release No. 18775 (July 6, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr18775.htm. Interestingly, in that case, the settlement did not include anti-brib-
ery violations. ABB disgorged $5.9 million to settle books and records and internal controls
violations. Consent of Defendant, SEC v. ABB Ltd., 10-CV-01648-PLF, supra.
150. Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, supra note 24, at 981 (citations omitted).
Koehler explains that there is an “intuitive appeal” to disgorgement in enforcement actions
charging violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the Act. Id. at 982. Yet the SEC’s use of
the disgorgement remedy is routine, regardless of whether the action involves only violations
of the accounting provisions in the absence of anti-bribery violations. Id.
151. See Karen E. Woody, No Smoke and No Fire, supra note 47, at 1751–52.
152. See Richard L. Cassin, Teva Pays Second Biggest FCPA Disgorgement, FCPA BLOG (Sept.
25, 2017, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/25/telia-also-tops-our-new-top-
ten-disgorgements-list.html. The disgorgement amounts paid in 2016 and 2017 that land in
the top ten list of highest disgorgement amounts to date are: Telia, $457 million; Teva
Pharmaceuticals, $236 million; Och-Ziff, $199 million; VimpelCom, $375 million; and JPMor-
gan Chase, $130.5 million. Id. The other largest disgorgement amount  remains that of
Siemens, $350 million, which was settled in 2008. Id.
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the DOJ is not able to extract any quid pro quo in exchange for a
criminal declination. There is no process by which the government
can extract money without at least a settlement agreement. In the
cases of NCH, HMT, Linde NA, and CDM Smith, the declination
letters made clear both that companies were to pay the required
disgorgement amount to the United States Treasury within ten
days; in addition, both companies had to agree that they would not
“seek or accept directly or indirectly reimbursement or indemnifi-
cation from any source with regard to the Disgorgement
Amount.”153 Further, both companies had to agree that “no tax de-
duction may be sought in connection with any part of [ ] payment
of the Disgorgement amount.”154
The DOJ’s process related to disgorgement in FCPA matters dif-
fers from the SEC’s, and seems to suggest that the “disgorgement”
amounts in the DOJ dispositions are much more punitive than re-
medial in nature. The justification for the tax deduction of
disgorgement is that it is a remedy that is calculated based on the
company’s reported pre-tax profits, which leaves open the possibil-
ity that an issuer or a subsidiary can seek refunds on taxes paid for
historical profits that were ultimately disgorged.155
As noted above, the DOJ does have civil authority under the
FCPA for domestic concerns that do not fall within the jurisdiction
of the SEC.156 This raises the question whether, in these declina-
tions with disgorgement, the DOJ merely conflated its two statutory
jurisdictional authorities. In other words, the DOJ put on its “civil
authority” hat while demanding disgorgement where the SEC could
not; at the same time, the DOJ, using its criminal authority, issued a
declination. There are a myriad of problems with this academic at-
tempt to justify a declination with disgorgement, and the evidence
of the dispositions suggest that the DOJ was not undertaking this
analysis when issuing its declinations. First, the declinations with
disgorgement were issued pursuant to the Pilot Program, which is
housed in DOJ Criminal Fraud.157 Second, the letters themselves
were issued on DOJ Criminal Fraud letterhead and signed by a DOJ
prosecutor.158 Finally, the text of the declination letters themselves
153. Letter to HMT, LLC, supra note 4, at 2; Letter to NCH, Corp., supra note 4, at 2.
154. Letter to HMT, LLC, supra note 4 at 2. ; Letter to NCH, Corp., supra note 4 at 2.
155. See Daniel Patrick Wendt, So How Does the DOJ Calculate Disgorgement?, FCPA BLOG,
Nov. 30, 2016, (Nov. 30, 2016, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/11/30/
daniel-patrick-wendt-so-how-does-the-doj-calculate-disgorgem.html.
156. See supra Part I-A.
157. Letter to HMT, LLC, supra note 4; Letter to NCH, Corp., supra note 4.
158. Id.
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clearly link the “declination” with the “disgorgement” which is pa-
tently inappropriate and confounding to all stakeholders involved.
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the DOJ was conflating its
civil and criminal jurisdiction into one disposition, the DOJ would
still need to bifurcate its declination and the disgorgement as two
separate dispositions for the reasons set out in this section: a decli-
nation is one-sided and does not have “strings attached.” Even if the
DOJ had jurisdictional authority for a criminal declination and a
civil disgorgement agreement, the use of the terms should be more
precise, for the reasons set out in sections III and IV. In short, stake-
holders cannot operate within a system that does not clearly set out
the standards of proof, the jurisdictional authority, and the proper
terms, particularly if the government muddies the water in the man-
ner it has with combined declinations with disgorgement.
C. Practical Consequences of Disgorgement in DOJ FCPA Enforcement
The elephant in the room with regards to declinations with dis-
gorgement strikes at the root definition of both of the terms, and is
the following: if disgorgement is “ill-gotten gains,” a declination, de-
spite prosecutorial discretion, likely is not appropriate because
illegal activity must have occurred in order for the company to have
received “illegal” profits. Of course, the DOJ has prosecutorial dis-
cretion not to bring certain actions, but setting up an entire Pilot
Program premised on a promise of lenient prosecutorial discretion
starts to look as if prosecutors are shirking their prosecutorial duty
to investigate and charge companies with violations of the law.159
On the other hand, if the company rightly deserves prosecutorial
discretion in the form of a declination, perhaps because the govern-
ment would be flat out unable to prove its case in a court of law,
then “disgorgement” is inappropriate and instead becomes govern-
ment extortion. In either case, there is at least a modicum of
corruption in the exact institution charged with ferreting out and
eradicating corruption. This Part explores both possibilities, ad-
dressing first the question of overextended prosecutorial discretion
in granting declinations while demanding payment.
159. This directly affects the expressive function of law, particularly in terms of what sig-
nals the government sends regarding what corporate behavior will be sanctioned and what
will be excused. See infra Part III.
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1. “Declinations with Disgorgement”: Government Extortion?
Prior to the Pilot Program, the DOJ had never required disgorge-
ment of profits in any of its FCPA enforcement actions. In the cases
of the Pilot Program involving DOJ disgorgement, the DOJ issued
declinations, meaning the DOJ stated that it would cease all investi-
gation and any subsequent prosecution of potential FCPA
violations.160 The extent of the investigation prior to the declination
is anyone’s guess, and it is possible that companies are compelled to
enter into declinations with disgorgement even when they would
otherwise contest the factual assertions made by the DOJ. The rea-
son for this is that companies involved in potential FCPA
malfeasance will jump at the notion of a declination, given the cur-
rent rigorous enforcement regime of the statute and the
corresponding penalties, and the sheer cost of defending an FCPA
investigation whether frivolous or not. In other words, the DOJ may
be making offers that companies simply cannot refuse. The only
catch, of course, is that companies must pay a “disgorgement.”
The risk of government abuse in these situations is alarming. In
practicality, what is happening is that the government does not con-
tinue its criminal investigation yet demands a sum in exchange for
the declination. One can imagine a situation wherein a company
that no longer wants to pay exorbitant legal fees for continued in-
ternal investigations and negotiations with the government will
agree to a number of options in order to “make it go away.” This is
the FCPA equivalent of civil forfeiture.161 Perhaps more aptly, decli-
nations with disgorgement may meet the elements of extortion
under the color of official right.162
Adding to the risk of abuse is the fact that nearly every FCPA
matter ends in settlement rather than in a court of law. As such,
there is little to no check or balance by the judiciary.163 This fact
160. See PILOT PROGRAM MEMO, supra note 1. Effectively, the DOJ could expend exactly
nothing in terms of resources or investigation costs and reach the same resolution.
161. The intersections between the Pilot Program’s declinations with disgorgement and
civil forfeiture are numerous, and will be explored in the author’s future scholarship. See
generally Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446 (2016).
162. The literature on extortion under color of office is highly relevant here. See James
Lindgren, The Theory, History and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1695, 1696 (1993) (“Historically, extortion under color of office is the seeking or receipt of a
corrupt payment by a public official (or a pretended public official) because of his office or
his ability to influence official action.”). Of course, the irony that the DOJ official charged
with rooting out corruption may be corrupt themselves should not be overlooked.
163. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Home-
land Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 22 (2011) (statement of Hon. Michael
Mukasey) (“The primary statutory interpretive function therefore is performed almost exclu-
sively by the DOJ Fraud Section and the SEC . . . [b]y negotiating resolutions in many cases
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exacerbates the pressure that the government can exert in order to
extract a settlement with terms favorable to itself.
2. The Irony of “Buying a Declination” for a
Potential Corruption Charge
While risk of governmental abuse of not proving allegations of
corruption before extracting disgorgement is valid, the other side
of that coin is that corporations potentially can abuse the same
loophole. For this reason, the bribery-extortion distinction proves
relevant. If, on one hand, the government is extorting companies
by requiring disgorgement, the same transaction can been seen as a
company bribing the government to issue a declination.164
Another way to analyze the declinations with disgorgement is to
ignore the term “declination” and treat the disposition as an NPA,
given the many similar characteristics.165 In other words, these dec-
linations with disgorgement really are settled agreements, or
contracts, between companies and the DOJ. Seen in this light, the
contractual terms of the “contract” are the following: forbearance
from further investigation and prosecution is the consideration
provided by the government; “disgorgement” is the price of the
contract for the company. Therefore, disgorgement is no longer
merely disgorgement—it is the price at which a company can buy
the declination.
Compliance with the FCPA is always a cost-benefit analysis to
companies.166 The Pilot Program inserts into that analysis the po-
tential ability to have the DOJ and SEC cease investigation and rely
before an indictment or enforcement actions is filed . . . . We are left with a circumstance in
which ‘the FCPA means what the enforcement agencies say it means.’”). Only one corporate
defendant has ever taken FCPA-related charges to trial, and that was a 1983 case from the
FCPA’s “pre-modern” era. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga.
1983). Since 2004, only two of the DOJ’s FCPA actions have even progressed to criminal
indictments, and both of those were dismissed. See United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d
1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Order for Dismissal, United States v. Cinergy Telecomm., Inc., No. 09-
CV-21010 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2012), http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/3000/
001659.pdf.
164. See generally United States v. v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Extortion
‘under color of official right’ equals the knowing receipt of bribes; they need not be solic-
ited.”); James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common
Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 815–20 (1988) (noting that the two crimes often
are not separated).
165. See supra Part II-A.
166. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 949, 949
n.1 (2009) (citing Laurie Brannen, Price of Sarbanes-Oxley Declines, BUS. FIN. (May 1, 2006),
http://businessfinancemag.com/bpm/upfront-price-sarbanes-oxley-compliance-declines,
and noting that in 2006, eighty-five percent of financial executives who undertook a survey
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upon the corporation’s internal investigation with the cost to the
company being only that of disgorgement. In other words, compa-
nies that are eligible for the Pilot Program ostensibly can “negotiate
away” any continued government investigation and prosecution,
provided that they can agree on an acceptable disgorgement
amount. In this case, “disgorgement” becomes a tax for doing
global business, required like a toll by the DOJ and SEC. If this
becomes the case, the deterrent effect of disgorgement is reduced
to nearly nothing, and the Pilot Program is reduced to being simply
a toll booth in FCPA enforcement. This outcome likely does not
deter other similarly-situated companies, nor does it raise the ethi-
cal standard of business practices abroad, despite the Pilot
Program’s goals.
III.  EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF “DECLINATIONS WITH
DISGORGEMENT”
As discussed above, the DOJ Pilot Program’s “declinations with
disgorgement” are neither declinations nor true disgorgement. The
use of the term “declinations with disgorgement,” therefore, creates
significant issues in both practice and theory. Section II-C discussed
various practical ramifications of declinations with disgorgement.
This section addresses the theoretical implications. The primary
danger with declinations with disgorgement is that the expressive
purpose of the law is undermined.167 The government sends out the
mixed message that the corporate conduct at issue is not conduct
did not believe that the benefits of compliance outweighed the costs); Sean J. Griffith, Corpo-
rate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2102–03 (2016)
(discussing the average budgets for compliance efforts and variations among industries);
Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2 WIS. L. REV. 609
(2012); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 488 (2003).
167. This argument closely aligns with Lon Fuller’s in Lon L. Fuller, MORALITY OF LAW
(rev. ed. 1969). Fuller identifies eight requirements of the rule of law.  Laws must be general,
specifying rules prohibiting or permitting behavior of certain kinds. Id. at 241–42. Laws must
also be widely promulgated, or publicly accessible. Id. Publicity of laws ensures citizens know
what the law requires. Laws should be prospective, specifying how individuals ought to behave
in the future rather than prohibiting behavior that occurred in the past. Id. Laws must be
clear, meaning citizens should be able to identify what the laws prohibit, permit, or require.
Id. Laws must be non-contradictory. One law cannot prohibit what another law permits. Id.
Laws must be able to be obeyed. The demands laws make on citizens should remain relatively
constant. Id. Finally, there should be congruence between what written statutes declare and how
officials enforce those statutes. Id.; see Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the
Rule of Law, 24 L. & PHIL. 239, 240–41 (2005); see also David Luban, Natural Law as Professional
Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, 18 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 176 (2001); Gerald J. Postema, Implicit Law,
13 L. & PHIL. 361 (1994); Jeremy Waldron, Why Law—Efficacy, Freedom or Fidelity?, 13 L. &
PHIL. 259 (1994).
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that is egregious enough to warrant prosecution, while at the same
time demanding alleged “ill-gotten gains.”
A. The Expressive Function of Statutory Enforcement
Expressive theorists have long argued that actions, including le-
gal actions, make statements that have significant meaning in
society.168 These actions signal to society what type of social conduct
is valued and what social conduct is sanctioned.169 In other words,
laws themselves, as well as the enforcement of laws (or lack thereof)
send certain messages to society. The expressive theory is of particu-
lar use when considering the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions
and the importance of uniformity in enforcement of criminal
laws.170 Professor Uhlmann, in particular, dissects the purpose of
corporate criminal prosecution through the lens of expressive theory
and expressive function.171 He argues that the expressive theory of
criminal law can serve both a retributive and utilitarian purpose,
but the critical factor for corporate criminal prosecution is the ex-
pressive function alone.172 In other words, Uhlmann argues that the
line-drawing and norm-setting functions of corporate criminal law
set the parameters by which we expect corporations to act. As Uhl-
mann puts it, “[c]riminal prosecution of corporations [ ] reflects
the societal imperative to respond to illegal behavior in a way that
168. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2024–25. Sunstein puts forward the proposition
that law “makes statements” rather than merely controlling behavior. Sunstein analyzes these
statements as means to effect social change and alter social norms. Id.; see also Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 946–48 (1995); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 520–21 (2001).
169. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419–20
(1999); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965); see
also David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1259 (2016) (citing Feinberg in stating that the expressive function
of criminal law is to allow society to “express its disavowal of criminal conduct, make clear its
non-acquiescence in impermissable behavior, vindicate the rule of law, and absolve the
innocent”).
170. See Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191,
1203–04 (2015).
171. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 169, at 1243. Uhlmann argues that treat-
ment of corporations and corporate criminal prosecution is critical to the expressive
function of criminal law for a number of reasons; first, that corporations enjoy significant
benefits with the expectation that corporations exist for legal purposes alone; second, corpo-
rations have “outsized power and influence”; and third, corporations cannot be jailed, so the
function of criminal justice is patently different. Id.; see David M. Uhlmann, Reconsidering
Corporate Criminal Prosecution, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 19, 2015), http://
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/19/reconsidering-corporate-criminal-prosecution/.
172. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 169, at 1260–1.
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upholds the rule of law, reinforces core societal values, provides ac-
countability, and ensures that justice has been done.”173 The lack of
criminal prosecution also sends an important signal to society, and
to corporations. Uhlmann makes this point clearly:
[W]hen we do not impose criminal liability upon corporations
that commit egregious violations of the law, we blur the lines
that the criminal law establishes between conduct that is ac-
ceptable and conduct that will not be tolerated. We express to
companies that break the law that their conduct is not so egre-
gious that it warrants criminal prosecution.174
As a result, Uhlmann argues, companies that do comply with the law
are “signaled” that their efforts are valued less; in other words, the
rule of law in general is weakened because the message sent to soci-
ety is that the law does not reflect adequately what is acceptable
corporate behavior, as measured by what behavior was prosecuted
and what behavior was not.175 Prof. Stuntz arrived at a similar con-
clusion, stating:
[O]nce legislators speak, once a crime is formally defined, po-
lice and prosecutors face the following choice—reinforce the
message by enforcing the new law, negate the message by leav-
ing the law unenforced, or revise the message by enforcing it
only in certain kinds of cases or against certain kinds of
defendants.176
The message the law sends can be imbued with a particular mes-
sage, but the enforcement methods and trends also send an equally
poignant message to society about acceptance of various conduct.177
B. Expressive Function of “Declinations with Disgorgement”
Expressive theory is squarely applicable to the FCPA Pilot Pro-
gram, in the following three areas: first, expressive theory sheds
light on the goals of the Pilot Program and the message that the
government wants to send to the regulated entities; second, expres-
sive theory assists in analyzing the ultimate dispositions undertaken
173. Id. at 1260.
174. Id. at 1263–4.
175. Id.
176. Stuntz, supra note 168, at 521–22.
177. Id.
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in the Pilot Program; finally, expressive theory underscores the im-
portance of a clear jurisdictional split between civil and criminal
authority, as relevant to recent declinations with disgorgement.
First, the goals of the Program, as detailed by the DOJ in its mem-
orandum, are increased transparency by the government and
deterrence for companies that may violate the FCPA. The govern-
ment wants to express the importance of both the rigorous
enforcement of the law as well as the reasonable leniency that the
government will afford companies that make significant efforts to
comply with both the FCPA and the Pilot Program. The DOJ wants
to have companies continue to “buy-in” to the Program; in other
words, the DOJ has an incentive to express that adequate coopera-
tion will result in a better disposition for a company under
investigation. This message seems to be well-received by companies,
given their interest in obtaining declinations and their interest in
receiving disgorgement rather than a penalty. The Pilot Program
really is a win-win for the DOJ. It allows the government to send the
signal that it will be “tough” on FCPA violators; at the same time,
the DOJ is able to reach resolutions while (potentially) relying on
the internal investigations done by the companies themselves.
Second, expressive theory applies in particular to the dispositions
taken under the Pilot Program, and even more so to the declina-
tions with disgorgement. In these cases, we see the ultimate
“blurring of lines” as to what conduct is acceptable and what is con-
demned.178 On the one hand, the DOJ issues a declination, a clear
decision not to prosecute. The message inherent in a declination is
that the conduct is not one that rises to the level of requiring crimi-
nal prosecution, which means that it is not egregious or threatening
to the rule of law. In the same breath, however, the DOJ requires
disgorgement, meaning that the government contends that ill-got-
ten gains were made by the company. The message, therefore, is
schizophrenic and demands some resolution in terms of the expres-
sive function of the law.
Finally, expressive theory assists with the supposed conflation of
the DOJ civil and criminal authority. As discussed above, if one is to
assume that the DOJ’s declinations with disgorgement are done
pursuant to the DOJ’s civil authority (where the SEC lacks jurisdic-
tion) and its criminal authority to issue a declination, the practical
178. See Feinberg, supra note 169, at 416–17; see also Stuntz, supra note 168, at 521 (noting
that it is the legislators who are “speaking” through expressive laws, but it is the police and
prosecutors who “control the volume”).
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issues regarding burdens of proof and other civil/criminal differ-
ences are only part of the problem. A larger theoretical problem
looms when the agency conflates its civil and criminal authority.
As Professor Hart stated:
What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that
distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposi-
tion . . . . It is not simply anything which a legislature chooses
to call a ‘crime.’ It is not simply antisocial conduct which pub-
lic officers are given a responsibility to suppress. It is not
simply any conduct to which a legislature chooses to attach a
‘criminal’ penalty. It is conduct which, if duly shown to have
taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of
the moral condemnation of the community.179
In other words, there is significant expressive function in the dis-
tinction between a criminal act and one that is merely a civil
infraction. Conflation of these two enforcement schemes and au-
thority does a disservice to society because it reduces the
significance of the critical distinction between criminal and civil
law.
IV. A LEGAL TOWER OF BABEL: MISUSE OF THE LEGAL LEXICON
Uhlmann’s article, and its progeny in expressive theory, plays a
critical role in the argument put forth by this Article. Yet I expand
the expressive theory even more broadly. Not only does the action
of corporate criminal prosecution signal to both corporations and
society at large what behavior is valued and what behavior is con-
demned, but so to do the words and terms used in the prosecutorial
process. This notion is rooted in textualist theory180 and can be
179. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404–05
(1958) (quoted in Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 169, at 1259 n.107). Hart ar-
gues that this moral condemnation sets criminal law apart from civil wrongs. He notes that
the difference is not simply that society has a greater interest in enforcing criminal laws;
society indeed has an interest in upholding civil law (i.e., honoring contracts). Id. at 403. In
addition, he notes that the identity of the parties is not the sole distinction between civil and
criminal law because the government often has civil enforcement authority. Id. at 404–05.
Rather, the thrust of his argument is that the moral condemnation of criminal law is what sets
it apart from civil wrongs. Id. at 405–06.
180. Textualist theory, however, is limiting in this analysis as I am not analyzing “text” or a
statute, per se, but the use of certain terms in a pretrial diversion negotiation. The analysis
draws on both the conversational and legal meaning of the terms. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI.
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seen as an outgrowth of the famous Derrida quote: “[t]here is noth-
ing outside the text.”181 The meanings commonly understood from
the terms of the text bind all stakeholders in the word-meaning
agreements.182 This simply is the “prime purpose of language”183
and is of utmost importance when considering legal terms and
definitions.184
A. The Importance of Correct Legal Terminology
The most critical ramification of the oxymoronic term “declina-
tion with disgorgement” is that it waters down the meanings of
important terms in our legal lexicon.185 Simply put, words matter.
Words describing the criminal dispositions of corporations are the
building blocks to the expressive function of corporate criminal
prosecution. When the government declines to prosecute a corpo-
ration for violations of the law, expressive theory, as Uhlmann aptly
described, argues that the rule of law is weakened.186 Similarly,
when the government uses the incorrect terms to describe what
sanctions it gives to corporations for potential corporate malfea-
sance, not only is the rule of law weakened but the entire legal
lexicon that we use to communicate among stakeholders and soci-
ety is rendered incoherent.187
In the case of the recent “declinations with disgorgement,” a dec-
lination no longer means “declination” in the sense that it has been
used (and defined in legal dictionaries) for decades. Likewise, the
use of the term “disgorgement” to describe a sum of money that is
L. REV. 1235 (2015). Fallon addresses the numerous theories of legal interpretation in order
to test whether the theories should be applied in a case-by-case basis. Id.
181. JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC. 148 (1988).
182. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 18–19 (2005).
183. See Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive
Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1123 (2008).
184. It should be noted that I am not engaging in a hermeneutical assessment of objectiv-
ity versus subjectivity when considering the terms “declination” and “disgorgement.” Rather,
my point is that the commonly understood usage of the terms is the foundation for commu-
nication among regulators and regulated entities. See Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological
Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas
and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988).
185. One may consider this argument the equivalent of legal term taxonomy, which differs
from general legal taxonomy. For an exposition of legal taxonomy, see Emily Sherwin, Legal
Taxonomy 15 L. THEORY 25 (2009).
186. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, supra note 169, at 1264.
187. See Fish, Intention Is All There Is, supra note 183, at 1125 (citing John F. Manning,
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 88 (2006)); see also Stanley
Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005).
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allegedly linked to illegal activity or ill-gotten gains is not disgorge-
ment. Nor is it disgorgement as a remedy in equity, as it has
historically been considered to be. Using these terms in such a fast
and loose manner in order to show that the government will afford
leniency in its prosecutorial discretion creates more confusion than
it does transparency.
Further, this distortion of the terms is important because the lan-
guage used to define certain remedies and penalties has vast
implications in the law. This is particularly true when similar terms
confer radically different outcomes. Consider, for example, the re-
cent Supreme Court case of Nelson v. Colorado, in which the Court
considered whether inmates whose convictions were overturned
must be repaid for the substantial fees and penalties they paid to
the state while incarcerated.188 The term used for what the inmate
paid is of critical importance to the central issue of whether he will
be repaid. That is, if what he paid was “restitution” for a crime for
which his conviction was ultimately overturned, he should be reim-
bursed the restitution amount, because it was wrongfully taken
from him.189 However, if what the defendant paid was termed “ad-
ministration fees” or, as Colorado argued, “compensation,” the case
looks entirely different in terms of legal and equitable resolu-
tions.190 In other words, this case underscores the importance of the
legal lexicon and the importance of particular terms used in law,
because these terms have significant consequences regarding how
law is shaped and applied.
When declinations with disgorgement are issued, the misuse of
the legal terms renders stakeholders, government regulators, and
defendants incapable of communication and mutual understand-
ing. The literal meaning of the term “declination” is simply the act
188. Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017). The fees included payment to the state
crime victim compensation fund, a “docket fee,” a “time payment fee,” a drug-test fees,
among others. Garrett Epps, Can States Make People Pay Even When Their Convictions Are Over-
turned? ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/can
-states-make-people-pay-even-when-their-convictions-are-overturned/512360/.
189. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to have agreed with this theory. See Steve
Vladeck, Argument Analysis: Justices Skeptical of Colorado’s Approach to Returning Payments by De-
fendants Whose Convictions Are Reversed on Appeal, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-justices-skeptical-colorados-approach-returning -
payments-defendants-whose-convictions-reversed-appeal/. The State of Colorado argued that
the inmates should not be compensated absent a clear finding of innocence. Id. In other
words, the Solicitor General of Colorado insisted that the inmates should be paid back only if
their convictions were overturned due to findings of innocence. During the oral argument,
however, the Chief Justice asked the Colorado Solicitor General why he used the term “com-
pensation.” Id. Specifically, the Chief Justice stated, “you keep talking about compensation.
The issue is restitution.” Id.
190. See id.
WINTER 2018] Declinations with Disgorgement 309
of declining. In literal or layman’s terms, a declination has a partic-
ular understanding—yet the term declination, when used in
context of a governmental decision, carries significant meaning. It
imports that the government does not find a reason to continue
with investigation or prosecution. There may be myriad reasons for
the declination. As for disgorgement, the literal meaning is one
that seems somewhat far afield from the legal meaning. “Disgorge”
means to discharge or emit. In legal terms, disgorgement is to “dis-
pose” of ill-gotten gains. I point out the non-legal understandings
of these two terms to underscore the importance of contextual un-
derstanding. Further muddying the water by using either
“declination” or “disgorgement” to create yet another legal mean-
ing is unnecessary at best and, at worst, dangerous to those who
trust and rely on the understood meaning.
In other words, the practical effects of this misuse are increased
risks of either regulators or corporations exploiting the lack of clar-
ity to the detriment of the enforcement scheme. Due to the fact
that the meanings have been distorted from their literal, conversa-
tional, and legal understandings, one is stuck asking the questions,
“what is a declination?” and “what is disgorgement?”191
B. Proposals for More Effective and More Transparent
Enforcement of the FCPA
The effects of the DOJ Pilot Program’s declinations with dis-
gorgement are wide-reaching and potentially catastrophic to our
understanding of commonly-used legal terms, as well as to the ex-
pressive function of the FCPA. As a practical matter, these
dispositions open the door to potential abuse by both the govern-
ment and companies. It is therefore worth considering how to
make certain adjustments to effectuate the aim of the Program
while acknowledging the importance of criminal prosecution in
FCPA enforcement. This Part addresses potential proposals that the
DOJ should consider when evaluating the merits of the Pilot
Program.
191. See Fallon, supra note 180.
310 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:2
1. Say What You Mean
The thrust of this Article is to point out that the terms used by
the DOJ in its Pilot Program are distorted, jeopardizing the expres-
sive function of the law. One potential “quick fix” to the instant
issue is to call these dispositions what they actually are: NPAs with
penalties, rather than declinations with disgorgement. As was
pointed out in Part II, these dispositions are not declinations, nor is
what they demand “disgorgement.” Using the correct terminology
for what the DOJ seeks to accomplish would help to clear up the
already opaque body of law surrounding FCPA enforcement.
In addition, using the correct terminology and referring to these
dispositions as NPAs with associated criminal penalties would help
to buttress the FCPA’s expressive function: certain criminal corpo-
rate activity will not be tolerated in society without some amount of
repercussion. Further, the legal lexicon is spared the distortion of
terms commonly understood to mean something else. That is to
say, a declination is a commonly understood term to prosecutors, as
well as society in general. Referring to a bilateral agreement as a
declination is a fundamental change in the definition of the term
and creates confusion and even mistrust between the government
and regulated entities. The same is true for the use of the term
disgorgement. Returning to the commonly understood usages of
these terms is an easy and concrete step towards affording both
transparency and understanding in FCPA enforcement.
2. Reduction of Pretrial Diversions
The larger issue of unclear FCPA enforcement standards is the
lack of judicial oversight and the lack of judicial precedent.192 Be-
cause an FCPA case is rarely taken to court, the terms and
conditions surrounding the settlement negotiations are often hard
to pin down. As this Article has described, declinations with dis-
gorgement are merely the most recent pretrial diversion scheme in
FCPA enforcement. The stage was set with the noted increase in
DPAs and NPAs. As a result, declinations with disgorgement did not
seem like much of a logical or remedial leap. Yet the risk of overuse
or abuse of declinations, or even DPAs and NPAs, creates an en-
forcement atmosphere wherein the government never proves its
cases. Companies quick to avoid any legal ramifications are more
192. See, e.g., Woody, No Smoke and No Fire, supra note 47, at 1751, 1756.
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than willing to pay the enforcement “toll” rather than get drawn
into litigation.
Forcing the government to take more cases to court and prove
the culpability of companies would reduce the risk of abuse of the
pretrial diversion schemes. This solution is likely less practical,
given the incentives for companies to settle cases rather than go to
court; likewise, the DOJ and SEC are less likely to walk away from
pretrial diversion schemes if the result is that these agencies must
expend the resources to prove up their cases. Nevertheless, an in-
crease in judicial precedent for FCPA matters would go a long way
in clearing up the many ill-defined parameters of the law.
CONCLUSION
The use of disgorgement in the context of a declination from the
DOJ is entirely novel and poses a new frontier of available remedies
for the government in the absence of extensive investigation or
prosecution. What is problematic in these declinations is that illegal
activity is alleged but not proven. This renders the disgorgement
amounts untethered, in a legal sense, to the actions alleged. The
result of this is a practical risk of abuse from both the government
and corporations and a theoretical risk of misuse of legal terms and
remedies, creating havoc in the law and opaqueness for the stake-
holders who must comply with the law. Importantly, the expressive
function of the law is sending two opposing messages: the govern-
ment is shirking enforcement of the FCPA in favor of declinations,
but at the same time requiring disgorgement of allegedly ill-gotten
gains. This Article suggests that the novel pretrial diversion scheme
of declination with disgorgement creates more problems than it
solves, both practically and theoretically, and should not be the op-
timal course of action despite the ease with which it creates
resolutions for companies and the government. The slippery slope
is the deterioration of remedial options and legal terms themselves.
